Consciousness and Content in Perception by Brewer, Bill
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1111/phpe.12091
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Brewer, B. (2018). Consciousness and Content in Perception. Philosophical Perspectives, 31(1), 41-54.
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12091
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
 1 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONTENT IN PERCEPTION 
BILL BREWER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Normal perception involves conscious experience of the world. What I call the 
Content View, (CV), attempts to account for this in terms of the representational 
content of perception (Brewer, 2011, esp. ch. 4). I offer a new argument here against 
this view. 1 
 
Ascription of personal level content, either conceptual or nonconceptual, depends on 
the idea that determinate predicational information is conveyed to the subject. This 
determinate predication depends upon the exercise of certain personal level capacities 
for categorization and discrimination. Exercise of such personal level capacities 
depends in turn upon conscious selective attention. Yet conscious visual acquaintance 
with the world is the prior ground for the possibility of any such conscious selective 
attention. Acquaintance obtains throughout the visual field: where conscious attention 
is not actually directed as well as where it is. So acquaintance does not depend upon 
conscious selective attention. Thus, acquaintance is not sufficient for the exercise of 
the relevant personal level capacities. Exercise of these capacities is nevertheless 
necessary for personal level content. Therefore visual acquaintance cannot be 
understood in terms of perceptual content: basic conscious experience of the world is 
                                                        
1 As in earlier discussions, I focus throughout on visual perception. 
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not a matter of anything like the predication involved in perceptual content. It is rather 
the relational ground for the possibility of such predication. 
 
Clearly every move in this argument needs clarification and defence. I offer this in §1. 
In §2 I consider the implications for the Content View. §3 concludes. 
 
1. The Key Argument 
 
My Key Argument, (KA), may be set out in abbreviated form as follows. 
 
(1) P-Level Content  P-Level Predication 
(2) P-Level Predication  P-Level Capacities 
(3) P-Level Capacities  Conscious Selective Attention 
(4) Not-(Acquaintance  Conscious Selective Attention) 
(5) So Not-(Acquaintance  P-level Capacities) 
(6) So Not-(Acquaintance  P-level Content) 
 
This section offers elucidation of its constituent notions, and motivation for its 
substantive premises. 
 
(1) P-Level Content is the proposition that: 
 
a subject, S, is in a conscious perceptual state with personal level representational 
content. 
 
 3 
This means that S’s perceptual experience represents it as being the case that certain 
elements of the world around her are some more or less determinate way.23 Now, her 
perceptual experience is a personal level representational state, rather than one 
deployed only subpersonally. So this more or less determinate predication is 
conveyed in some way to her. 
 
This is P-Level Predication, the proposition that: 
 
there is a more or less determinate way that certain worldly elements are 
experientially represented as being to S herself. 
 
Thus: 
 
P-Level Content  P-Level Predication 
 
(2) It follows from P-Level Predication that S is in receipt of more or less determinate 
predicational information, or misinformation, about the world around her. Now the 
                                                        
2 I intend the most general notion of representational content and certainly mean to 
include the various forms of conceptual and nonconceptual content that have been 
invoked in philosophical theories of perceptual experience. Influential illustrations of 
the idea and its variety can be found in Anscombe (1965), Armstrong (1968), 
Peacocke (1983, 1992), McDowell (1994), Tye (1995, 2000), Dretske (1995), Byrne 
(2001), Siegel (2010), Pautz (2010), and Schellenberg (2010, 2011). 
3 Here and throughout I use the term ‘element’ to cover objects, features, and regions 
of the world around the perceiver. 
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predication involved here is in principle indefinitely variable in what might be called 
its fineness of grain. More precisely, any specific case will involve the ascription of a 
more or less determinate property to an object, where this will be one of a range of 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive such determinates of a given determinable; 
and that determinable may in turn be partitioned into distinct such ranges of 
determinates in indefinitely many ways. Each of these ranges will contain a 
determinate, or multiple determinates, whose extensions overlap with that of the 
determinate ascribed in the initial case in question. Ascriptions of these alternatives 
would be predications at a different fineness of grain. 
 
A highly simplified example in the case of colour may help to clarify the point. 
Suppose we begin with a content ascribing a blue colour to an object, b. Candidate 
more or less determinate predications here might be any of those illustrated in the 
diagram below, as follows: (a) b is blue as opposed to green or purple; (b) b is dark 
blue as opposed to light blue; (c) b is medium blue as opposed to navy, duke, light, or 
sky blue, (d) b is B5, as opposed to any of the other fine Bn shades.
4 
 
| B - - L - - U - - E | 
                                                        
4 The reality is of course far more complex, with colours more accurately arranged in 
a 3D solid with the blues occupying a segment of the kind that football players might 
eat of an orange at half-time. See Munsell (1907) for the original conception and 
Palmer (1999, ch. 3) for comprehensive review of the major current issues. This 
additional complexity only adds to the force of my point, with the various candidate 
predications occupying multiply containing and intersecting solid 3D regions within 
the blue segment. 
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| Dark - Blue -  | Light - Blue - | 
| Navy | Duke | Medium | Sky | Light | 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 
 
The point generalizes quite straightforwardly to other basic predications made on the 
basis of visual perception, such as direction, distance, size, orientation, shape, texture, 
and so on. 
 
Thus, the ascription to the subject, S, of more or less determinate predicational 
information, or misinformation, about the world around her requires a principled 
account of where in this indefinite variety we are to locate the correct fineness of 
grain involved. The argument for premise (3) is that this principled account of the 
more or less determinate predication involved in perceptual content is to be given in 
terms of the specific capacities for categorization and discrimination that are 
exercised in her experience conveying that information. Furthermore, since the 
predication involved here is at the personal level, the capacities in question must also 
be personal level capacities: capacities exercised by S herself. The predication 
involved in personal level perceptual content conveys more or less determinate 
information (or misinformation) of a specific fineness of grain to the subject herself. 
Her receipt of information of that fineness of grain rather than any other is determined 
by her exercise of the relevant specific personal level capacities for categorization and 
discrimination rather than any other such capacities. 
 
So, from the assumption of P-Level Predication, we may derive P-Level Capacities, 
the proposition that: 
 6 
 
S exercises certain specific personal level capacities for categorization or 
discrimination in her perceptual experience: those that account for the specific 
fineness of grain of the more or less determinate predicational worldly information or 
misinformation that is conveyed to her. 
 
Again, some examples may help to fix and motivate the principle further. 
 
Let us begin with the conceptual paradigm for representational content. Conceiving of 
S’s perceptual experience as a conscious state with conceptual representational 
content, that a is F, say, commits the theorist to regarding S as actually deploying the 
relevant predicational concept, ‘F’, in her experience, regardless of whether or not she 
endorses the full content in judgement. A certain worldly element is conceptually 
categorized as F in her experience. This is an exercise of the very conceptual capacity 
that is equally involved in her judgement that a1 is F, a2 is F, a3 is not F, and so on, as 
opposed to the distinct capacity conceptually to categorize such things as F’, F’’, and 
so on, for other candidate predications at a different fineness of grain.5 Thus, a version 
                                                        
5 The idea that a subject exercising genuinely conceptual categorization in any 
particular case is equally capable of further applications of the same concept in 
different cases is one conjunct of Evans’ famous Generality Constraint that I accept as 
a plausible constraint on genuinely conceptual content ascription (Evans, 1982, ch. 
4ff). See also his (1985) for the importance of judgements of not-F-ness, as opposed 
simply to the withholding of judgements of F-ness. For further discussion, see 
Campbell (1986), Peacocke (1992, ch. 2), and Heck (2000). For dissent, see Travis 
(1994). 
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of the claim in question here is that, in the conceptual case, a principled account of the 
fineness of grain of the more or less determinate predicational information that is 
conveyed to the subject in her perceptual experience is given by the specific 
capacities for conceptual categorization that she exercises in that perception.6 
 
I contend that the general principle extends equally to the nonconceptual case. In 
terms resonant of Peacocke’s related Discrimination Principle (1988, p. 468), this 
may be formulated as follows. 
 
For each content that may be assigned to a representational state of a subject, 
there is an adequately individuating account of what makes it the case that her 
state has that content rather than any other. 
 
Premise (2) of (KA) elaborates this principle further in two ways. First,  
it emphasizes that the more or less determinate predication involved in conscious 
perceptual content is personal level predication, accessible in some way to the subject 
herself. From this it derives the qualification that the relevant adequately 
individuating accounts are equally to be given in personal level terms. Second, it 
                                                        
6 A claim along somewhat similar lines is Davidson’s that belief depends on 
language, “for the only access to the fine structure and individuation of beliefs is 
through the sentences speakers and interpreters of speakers use to express and 
describe beliefs” (1986, p. 315). The Davidsonian thesis is vulnerable to objection, 
though, for introducing inessential epistemic conditions into the metaphysics of mind, 
by insisting that conditions on determinate belief acquisition should in some way be 
recognizable or knowable. 
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insists that such personal level individuating accounts make essential reference to 
certain capacities that she exercises in her perceptual experience. In the 
nonconceptual case these are less demanding than any explicit conceptual 
categorization; but, in order to provide a principled specification of the level of 
fineness of grain of the predication involved, they must constitute the actual 
discrimination of a more or less determinate worldly element in such a way as to 
sustain relevant sorting or other differential behaviour in relation to elements alike in 
that way, rather than in some similar way at a different fineness of grain. Thus, a 
second version of the claim in question here is that, in the nonconceptual case, a 
principled account of the fineness of grain of the more or less determinate 
predicational information that is conveyed to the subject in her perceptual experience 
is given by the specific capacities for discrimination that she exercises in her 
perception that sustain her sorting and other differential behavior in relation to 
worldly elements alike at the relevant fineness of grain. 
 
Finally, it may be illuminating to comment on the place of considerations of causal 
antecedence in content determination. Although these surely make a significant 
contribution to the determination of perceptual content, they fail to engage directly 
with the central issue of concern here, which is the principles constraining our 
ascription of more or less determinate fineness of grain in the predicational 
information, or misinformation, about the world that is conveyed to the subject in 
perception. In this connection, I claim, we have to appeal in addition to the personal 
level capacities that are actually exercised in her receipt of precisely that fineness of 
grain of worldly information, or misinformation. 
 
 9 
Thus: 
 
P-Level Predication  P-Level Capacities 
 
(3) Recall that P-Level Capacities is the proposition that S exercises certain specific 
personal level capacities for categorization or discrimination in her perceptual 
experience: those that account for the specific fineness of grain of the more or less 
determinate predicational worldly information or misinformation that is conveyed to 
her. (3) asserts that her exercise of those capacities depends upon her attention to the 
elements of the world around her that this predicational information concerns, 
consciously selecting them precisely for the further processing that constitutes her 
exercise of the capacities in question. 
 
Categorizing and discriminating require sustained attention to the specific 
environmental elements concerned that set the norms for like categorization and 
discrimination in future judgement and sorting or other differential behaviour. Just 
those elements have to be selected from the full range of alternatives available in 
order to sustain the capacities in question and control and coordinate the subject’s 
behavior in actually realizing them. This is a necessary consequence of the processing 
limitations that govern our cognitive lives and shape our conscious personal level 
perspectives upon the world around us. Furthermore, since the personal level 
capacities for categorization and discrimination involved are exercised with 
understanding on the part of the subject herself, in the sense required for her grasp of 
the perceptual contents in question and their provision of a rational basis for 
 10 
subsequent thought and action, the attentional selection involved here involves 
conscious attention.7 
 
So P-Level Capacities implies Conscious Selective Attention, the proposition that: 
 
S is consciously attending selectively to certain specific elements of her environment: 
those that are the focus of her exercise of the relevant personal level capacities. 
 
This premise is highly consonant with the assumptions shaping empirical work on 
visual attention over the last 50 years and with the main results that have been 
obtained.8 The basic assumption lying behind the design and interpretation 
experimental work on perceptual attention in cognitive psychology is that attention 
involves a form of subpersonal selection, or filtering, of information for further 
processing that is essential to deal with the capacity limitations of the brain and with 
the bodily limitations on simultaneous and sequential action. Wu’s reading of the 
central results of this empirical work is that this subpersonal processing filter is 
governed at the personal level by the conscious selection of specific environmental 
elements as targets to guide and control performance on relevant tasks. His general 
                                                        
7 See Campbell (2002) and Smithies (2011) for further development of this idea. They 
propose different accounts of the most fundamental distinctive cognitive role of 
conscious attention. Both apply in my view to the personal level categorization and 
discrimination characteristic of normal perceptual content. 
8 See Wu (2014) for detailed discussion of the major paradigms and findings of this 
work and extended discussion of their philosophical implications. What follows is 
derived directly from his discussion (esp. chs. 1 & 3). 
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conclusion is that attention is selection for (mental or physical) action. In any case, 
the vast body of empirical work and associated psychological theorizing about 
perceptual attention confirm the central point here, that attention is necessary for the 
processing in relation to consciously selected elements that constitutes the exercise of 
personal level capacities for categorization and discrimination. 
 
Thus: 
 
P-Level Capacities  Conscious Selective Attention 
 
(4) Acquaintance is the proposition that: 
 
S is acquainted with certain elements of the world around her. 
 
That is to say, in the current context, that S is visually conscious of those elements. In 
other words, as I use the notion here, S is acquainted with all and only the worldly 
elements that are present in her conscious visual field. 
 
Thus, acquaintance obtains in relation to elements of the world around the subject that 
are not consciously selected in attention as well as to those that are. For conscious 
acquaintance is precisely what delineates the range of alternatives that are available 
for possible attentional selection. S may therefore be acquainted with certain elements 
of her environment and yet actually be directing her conscious selective attention 
elsewhere or otherwise: not to these particular elements of acquaintance. Indeed, 
given the capacity limitations noted above, both in terms of neural processing and in 
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terms of bodily action, there will always be elements of the world around her within 
her acquaintance that are not currently targets of conscious attentional selection: what 
is often called the ‘background’ of attention. So it is not the case that Acquaintance in 
relation certain specific elements of the world around S implies Conscious Selective 
Attention in relation to those very same worldly elements. 
 
Again the central idea here can be elaborated in relation to relevant empirical work on 
attention.9 Relations between consciousness and attention are complex and 
controversial. For present purposes I steer clear of their most controversial aspects 
and rely only on claims that may be agreed on all sides. First, although there is 
compelling evidence of selective attention in the absence of conscious acquaintance, 
in cases of blindsight, for example (Kentridge, Heywood, and Weiskrantz, 1999, 
2004),10 and even in normal subjects under specially contrived circumstances in 
                                                        
9 See Mole (2008, 2014) and Phillips (2016, in press, forthcoming) for helpful 
reviews and discussion of the most important results here. 
10 Although see Mole (2008, §4) for an interesting argument that the evidence may 
not be conclusive. This is based upon a distinction between the cue stimulus, of which 
the subject is not conscious, but which is also claimed not to be an object of his 
attention, and the cued region of the blind hemifield, to which the subject is indeed 
attending, yet of which it is also claimed that he is conscious. This last claim, that the 
blindsighted subject may nevertheless be consciously oriented towards regions of his 
blind hemifield rests in turn upon an analogy with sighted subjects’ purported 
conscious orientation to the whole space around them, including regions to which 
they are not currently perceptually receptive – the region directly behind them, 
say. Whatever the merits of this idea of conscious orientation to unperceived 
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which they are not conscious of ‘objects’ present in rapidly changing stimuli 
(Norman, Heywood, and Kentridge, 2013), we are concerned here only with cases of 
attention to worldly elements of conscious acquaintance. For the topic is precisely 
how to understand the nature of normal conscious perceptual experience. Of course 
the account given must be, and is, consistent with all of these results; but the 
phenomenon in question is distinct from blindsight and other cases of ‘perception’ 
without conscious awareness in precisely this regard: it is a person’s conscious 
experience of the world around her.11 Second, although attention may be necessary 
for some forms of consciousness, for example of “very small or very unexpected 
changes” (Mole, 2008, p. 92), there will in general be many elements of the world 
around the perceiver that she is acquainted with – that are present in her visual field – 
but that are not objects of selective visual attention.12 
                                                                                                                                                              
regions of space, it does not obviously entail perceptual acquaintance with 
those regions as I understand that notion here. So for present purposes, I accept 
Kentridge et al’s compelling evidence of attention without consciousness in the 
relevant sense, in certain abnormal perceptual situations. For illuminating 
discussion of our conscious orientation to the whole space around us, see 
O’Shaughnessy (1980, vol. II, chs. 7 & 8), Ayers (1993, vol. I, pt. iii), and Martin 
(1992, 1999). 
11 For skepticism about the very idea of genuine perception without conscious 
awareness, see Phillips (2016, in press, forthcoming). 
12 Mack and Rock (1998) dispute this claim, insisting that there is “no conscious 
perception without attention” (p. ix); but they are able to do so only by question-
beggingly defining attention as “the process that brings a stimulus to consciousness” 
 14 
 
This is simply to repeat the point that attention is genuinely selective. Some amongst 
the worldly elements of acquaintance get into conscious attention at any time; the 
remainder do not and yet remain as part of its consciously present background – 
against which the consciously attentionally selected elements are foregrounded – in 
ways that elements entirely outside the subject’s visual field are not. Conscious 
attentional selection is only of a subset of the worldly elements with which she is 
consciously acquainted in perception. 
 
Thus: 
 
Not-(Acquaintance  Conscious Selective Attention) 
 
(5) Not-(Acquaintance  P-level Capacities) follows from (3) and (4) 
 
(6) Not-(Acquaintance  P-level Content) follows from (1), (2), and (5). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(p. 25). Mole persuasively argues that their experimental results fail to establish their 
conclusion without begging the question in this way (2008, §3). Inattentional 
blindness phenomena (Mack and Rock, 1998; Simons and Chabris, 1999; 2007; 
Block, 2007) may be interpreted in line with Mack and Rock’s thesis; but this 
interpretation is by no means obligatory and is in fact both unpopular and 
unmotivated. 
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Thus, S may be acquainted with various elements of the world around her in spite of 
not being in a conscious perceptual state with personal level representational content 
concerning those elements.13 
 
3. Against the Content View 
 
According to what I call the Content View, (CV) (2011, esp. ch. 4), the most 
fundamental account of our normal perceptual relation with the physical world is to 
be given in terms of the complete representational contents of perceptual experience. 
In particular, I focus here on the idea that the correct theoretical articulation of the 
way things are for the subject, S, when she sees the world around her, begins, as its 
foundation, with the claim that she is in a conscious perceptual state with personal 
level representational content. The remaining substance of the theory is taken up with 
questions about the type of representational content in question, the range of contents 
of that type that are eligible contents for perceptual experience itself, the necessary 
conditions upon, and consequences of, S being in a perceptual state with a specific 
content of that type, the relations between the contents of S’s perception and her 
conscious condition at the time, the role of such representational contents of 
perceptual experience in her perceptual knowledge of the world around her, and so 
on. This approach can seem almost inevitable; and important arguments from 
                                                        
13 See Amijee (2013) for compelling interpretation and elaboration of a similar line of 
argument from Russell’s (1912) theory of knowledge: “acquaintance with an object is 
not alone sufficient for knowledge of any truths about it [nor, as I argue here, for any 
perceptual content concerning it]; attention is also necessary” (Amijee, 2013, p. 
1184). 
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Schellenberg (2011) and Siegel (2010, ch. 2) attempt to make that case. My goal in 
the current section is to deploy (KA), as elaborated in §2, against (CV) and in 
diagnosis of the error in Schellenberg’s argument for (CV).14 
 
The crucial first half of Schellenberg’s Master Argument, (MA), runs as follows 
(2011, p. 719). 
 
(P1) If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering from blindsight 
etc.), then she is aware of the world. 
(P2) If a subject is aware of the world, then the world seems a certain way to her. 
(P3) If the world seems a certain way to her, then she has an experience with content 
C, where C corresponds to the way the world seems to her. 
(Con) If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering from 
blindsight etc.), then she has an experience with content C, where C corresponds to 
the way the world seems to her. 
 
I accept (P1) as a straightforward elaboration of the kind of perceptual relatedness that 
is in question: conscious perceptual experience, or awareness, of the world. So the 
crucial issue for (MA) concerns relation between the awareness that a subject, S, has 
of the world around her in perception, and her having an experience with content C. 
 
In order to focus the discussion and to pinpoint the error in (MA) that most clearly 
illustrates my basic objection to (CV), I adopt a maximally sympathetic interpretation 
                                                        
14 I believe that the application to Siegel is relatively straightforward; but I do not 
establish this here. 
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of (P2) on which this is also perfectly acceptable. It begins with the Moorean insight 
that the most explicit description of the conscious character of perceptual experience 
involves a description of the worldly elements themselves that the subject is 
apparently aware of in that experience (1922, p. 25; see also Strawson, 1979, pp. 45-
6). This description constitutes a plausible understanding of the specific way the 
world seems her. Thus, we have (P2). If a subject is aware of the world, then the 
world seems a certain way to her: the way given in the description of the worldly 
elements that she is apparently aware of. 
 
Next, it is important to distinguish a weak from a strong reading of Schellenberg’s 
conclusion, (Con). 
 
(Conw) If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering from 
blindsight etc.), then she has an experience with content C, where C corresponds to 
certain aspects of the way the world seems to her. 
 
(Cons) If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering from 
blindsight etc.), then she has an experience with content C, where C corresponds to 
the entirety of the way the world seems to her. 
 
According to (Conw), whenever S is perceptually related to the world around her, then 
certain aspects of the way the world seems to her may be articulated in terms of her 
being in a conscious perceptual state with personal level representational content. 
 18 
There are legitimate grounds for concern about this claim.15 But so far as (KA) is 
concerned it may yet be true. In this context, its truth depends on that of the claim that 
whenever S is perceptually related to the world, some of its elements at least are 
selected, either endogenously or exogenously, by her conscious attention. If the latter 
claim is correct, and the attention involved selects for further processing constituting 
the exercise of personal level capacities of categorization and discrimination 
associated with the more or less determinate predication involved in content C, then 
there is no obstacle so far as (KA) is concerned to the idea that that experiential 
content corresponds with certain aspects of the way the world seems to her. 
 
(Cons) is refuted by my Key Argument above, though. For, according to premise (4) 
of (KA), whenever S is perceptually related to the world, there will be elements of her 
environment that she is consciously acquainted with – that must therefore be included 
in the description of what she is apparently aware of that constitutes the way things 
seem to her – that are nevertheless not attentionally selected. Given premises (1)-(3) 
of (KA), then, these aspects of her awareness cannot correspond with any perceptual 
experiential content. So, although S is perceptually related to the world, and may have 
an experience with content C that may indeed capture certain aspects of the way the 
world seems to her, C cannot possibly correspond to the entirety of the way the world 
seems to her. 
 
I take it that (CV) is committed to (Cons). For its definitive insight is that the way the 
world seems to S in perception is precisely a representational matter analogous to the 
                                                        
15 See in particular Campbell (2002, esp. ch. 6), Travis (2004), Brewer (2011, esp. ch. 
4), and Campbell and Cassam (2014). 
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way the world ‘seems’ to her according to the ‘world view’ consisting of her 
empirical beliefs. I also read Schellenberg’s argument as intended to establish this 
version of her conclusion. This is strongly suggested in her explicit discussion and 
motivation of her premises (P2) and (P3) (2011, §2.1). In any case, I stipulate (CV) in 
this form as my own target for critical evaluation, and I assume for the remainder of 
the discussion that this is also the preferred conclusion of Schellenberg’s (MA). So 
(P3) should be correspondingly strengthened as follows. 
 
(P3s) If the world seems a certain way to her, then she has an experience with content 
C, where C corresponds to the entirety of way the world seems to her. 
 
Then (KA) offers a straightforward diagnosis of the error in (MA). Given our 
understanding of the way the world seems to S in perception, (P3s) is simply false. 
The notion of content fails to capture the entirety of the way things seem to the 
subject. For, as I explained above, there will always be unattended worldly elements 
of acquaintance that are essential to the way things seem to her but do not show up in 
the more or less determinate predicational information, or misinformation, conveyed 
by her perceptual content.16 
                                                        
16 Although I doubt that this is her intention, it is interesting to note that there is a 
point at which Schellenberg herself hints at something like this picture, in her 
suggestion that Chisholm’s (1957, pp. 50-3) noncomparative looks provide a 
foundation for the comparative looks that perhaps constitute the predications of 
perceptual content (2011, p. 722). It would be fruitful to consider further this 
suggestion that noncomparative looks correspond with unattended elements of 
 20 
 
Suppose in objection that we idealize the perceiver.17 Perhaps ordinary perceivers like 
S cannot process all of the information contributing to their conscious visual 
perspective on the world because of various limitations. Consider instead a perceiver, 
S’, not facing the same processing limitations in an otherwise identical perceptual 
situation to S.18 So far as (KA) is concerned, there may be a content, C, that 
corresponds to the entirety of the way the world seems to S’. If so, then should we not 
also admit that C is the entirety of the way the world seems to S, in the sense that C 
contains all the information that S could access in some relevant sense? If this is the 
point of (CV), then the objection from (KA) fails. In reply, though, I claim that, in the 
absence of the actual exercise of specific capacities for categorization or 
discrimination, then there is no determinacy in the predicational fineness of grain of 
the information that would be conveyed to the subject were some such capacities 
exercised. For this depends precisely on the specifics of the capacities in question; 
and there are, as we have already seen, indefinitely many alternatives available in 
connection with the various worldly elements that are present in S’s conscious visual 
perspective. It is the specific capacities for categorization and discrimination that are 
exercised in attention that determine the predicational fineness of grain of S’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
acquaintance, whereas comparatives necessarily involve the attention required to 
sustain more or less determinate predication. 
17 Thanks to Matt Parrott for this line of objection. 
18 I ignore for the sake of the argument concerns there may be about the very 
coherence of a perceiver like S’. If the genuine selectivity of conscious attention is 
essential to the nature of any visual experience, then the objection does not get off the 
ground. 
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personal level perceptual contents. In their absence, there is no saying what exactly C 
would be, were S’ to exercise some such capacities or others in S’s situation.19 
 
It may also be objected that my discussion has been unfair to (MA) in adopting the 
Moorean reading of the way the world seems to S. This notion should instead have 
been more narrowly construed in the way suggested by Schellenberg’s seems-content 
link, very crudely, that “the content of experience corresponds [entirely] to the way 
the world seems to the experiencing subject” (2011, p. 723). Certainly (P3s) is then 
secured by this definition of the way the world seems to S; and (Cons) immediately 
follows. But this is really just a case of rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. For 
the strength of the (CV) that results – how much, if any, of S’s awareness of the world 
in perception is accounted for by her having an experience with content C – is 
precisely the strength of the (CV) that is fed into the argument at (P2). And, as we 
have already seen, (KA) demonstrates that the entirety of S’s awareness of the world 
cannot possibly correspond with the way the world seems to her in this narrower 
sense. So we are back to the point that (KA) refutes the most natural paradigm of 
(CV) that is my explicit target here. Schellenberg’s (MA) attempts to conjoin innocent 
versions of both (P2) and (P3) in defence of (CV); but (KA) establishes that this 
cannot be done. 
 
(KA) therefore constitutes a quite general argument against the central (CV) 
contention that the correct theoretical articulation of the way things are for the 
subject, S, when she perceives the world around her, begins, as its foundation, with 
                                                        
19 See Stazicker (2011) for a closely related argument for the constitutive dependence 
of certain aspets of conscious vision on conscious attention that exploits the 
indeterminacy of visual consciousness in the absence of conscious attention. 
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the claim that she is in a conscious perceptual state with personal level 
representational content. Furthermore, my discussion of (MA) strongly suggests that 
this (CV) contention effectively involves a fatal equivocation on the way things seem 
to the subject in perception, between how things are consciously for the subject in 
relation to the world in perception, on the one hand, and what more or less 
determinate predicational information is actually conveyed to the subject as a result of 
this along with her categorizing or discriminating attentional selection amongst the 
worldly elements of her conscious acquaintance, on the other. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
There are aspects of our conscious perceptual relation with the world around us that 
cannot be captured in terms of the representational content of perceptual experience. I 
myself subscribe instead to an account of these by appeal to a fundamental layer of 
perceptual consciousness consisting in the subject’s standing in a relation of 
conscious acquaintance with particular mind-independent elements of the world 
around her (2011, esp. ch. 5). In any case, the principled obstacles to a wholly 
representational account of perceptual consciousness set out here undermine the 
prospects of any orthodox Content View of perception.20 
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